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Abstract
This paper considers the implications of the UK leaving the European Union (EU) for
‘The City’ of London and the wider UK financial sector and for the EU’s Capital
Markets Union (CMU) project. The extent of the impact of Brexit through job losses in
London and gains in EU financial centres and the relocation of financial sector business
will depend on the degree of ‘hardness’ or ‘softness’ of Brexit and indeed whether an
exit treaty deal is struck or ‘no-Brexit’ follows a second referendum. At the time of
writing (in November 2018) the likely denouement was far from clear. For the EU’s
flagship CMU project, the loss of the core London capital markets will require the
construction of a more fragmented system based in a number of cities within the EU. In
this digital age, the various hubs can perhaps be fully networked whilst better serving
distinct regional needs.
1 ‘Hard’, ‘Soft’ or No ‘Brexit’?
Following the historic vote (in the June 2016 referendum in the United Kingdom (of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland) to leave the European Union (EU) in June 2016, a
‘straw poll’ taken at the 34th GdR (European Money Banking and Finance) Sympo-
sium, Paris Nanterre 5th July 2017 revealed that a significant majority believed there
would be ‘No Brexit’. The next most popular option was a ‘Soft Brexit’.
By February 2018, Prime Minister Theresa May (PM) and the Chancellor Philip
Hammond (HM Treasury) seemed to favor remaining in a customs union for goods but
not for services (80% of the UK economy and 40% of exports to the EU) and hoped to
do a special deal for financial services including ‘mutual recognition’ of regulations for
the sector. In July 2018, a modified and more detailed version of the proposal (for a
‘facilitated customs arrangement’), was seemingly accepted (at Chequers, the country
House of the Prime Minister) by the ‘Cabinet’ of ministers of the United Kingdom
(UK) government. The aspiration for ‘mutual recognition’ (rejected by the EU’s
negotiating team led by Michel Barnier and undermined by divisions within The City,
was replaced by ‘enhanced, extended or expanded equivalence’ of regulations for the
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financial sector. However, subsequent to the publication of a ‘White Paper’ proposing
legislation to Parliament, there were prominent resignations from the government by
‘Brexiters’ (who seek a ‘hard’, or possibly a ‘no-deal’ Brexit) and pro-Brexiter
modifications were made to the proposals to gain Parliamentary approval. These
proposals formed the basis of the final round of pre-Brexit (March 2019) and (currently
20 months from March 2019 ‘transition period’) negotiations, even though the separa-
tion of goods from services, given the significant interactions between the sectors, did
not seem wise.
The UK’s ‘Chequers’ proposals are a variant of a ‘customs union’ option and related
to the ‘Canada model’ in excluding services; and hence access by financial companies
based in the UK the UK to the ‘Single Market’ in financial services through
‘passporting’, and in treating the UK as a ‘third country’. As such, it represents a
soft(ish) Brexit. A broader trade deal involving some service sectors and more en-
hancements to ‘equivalence’ for the financial sector would create a softer Brexit.
The degree of hardness or softness relates not just to the trading arrangements, but
also to restrictions to free movement of people between the UK and the EU, the size of
the UK contribution to the EU budget, and the extent of the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) in dispute resolution. The UK could attempt to ‘buy’ more
access to EU markets by adopting a variant of the ‘Norway model’, which involves
membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) and making contributions to the
EU budget in return for privileged access for financial services etc. Ultimately, the
degree of ‘hardness’ depends on the agreed trade-offs between budgetary contributions,
immigration restrictions, free trade in goods and/or services and the jurisdiction of the
ECJ.
The difficulty in reaching an agreement between the EU and UK on these complex
matters, about which both sides have ‘red lines’, including the desire by the EU to
maintain its four ‘freedoms’ (of movement of capital, citizens, good and services) is
compounded by the need to reach a ‘backstop agreement’ to resolve the Irish border
problem. The EU is insisting on maintaining a ‘free’ border between Northern Ireland
(NI) and Eire, and the UK wants to avoid a border with the EU in the Irish Sea; and not
to create a precedent for Scotland to seek enhanced independence within the UK. The
government relies for its majority of the votes in Parliament on members of the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of NI, who want to remain in the UK and for them
any border checks between NI and the rest of the UK is a ‘red line’. However, many
(‘Republican’, as opposed to ‘Loyalist’) people in NI want to remain as close to the EU
and the Republic of Ireland as possible. If his issue cannot be resolved amicably a flare
up of the historic ‘troubles’ could result.
One possibility might be to agree the general Brexit parameters in Autumn 2018 and
then to work on detailed resolution of outstanding issues, including those relating to
Ireland, subsequently and before the end of a (possibly extended) transition period.
Other options include a failure to reach an agreement (the ‘no deal’ option) or
parliamentary rejection of the agreed deal (or ‘no deal’), perhaps leading to a second
referendum with a revised question outlining options put to voters. The Brexiters’
opposition to any sort of customs union derives from the concern that it would severely
restrict options to develop trade deals not involving the EU.
At the time of writing, early November 2018, the negotiations between the EU and
the UK had reached an impasse and the PM mooted an extended transition period
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through to sometime in 2021. This would extend the period of uncertainty and was not
well received either by hard ‘Brexiters’, or by some ‘Remainers’; or indeed by business
representatives, who expressed frustration with the government. Opinion polls indicat-
ed that there had been some shift by the public towards remaining, but there was no
clear majority either way. Any extension of the transition period would also involve
further UK contributions to the subsequent financial year’s budget of the EU and would
thus open up further negotiations and be anathema to the herd Brexiters. The proba-
bility of a ‘no deal’ Brexit seemed to have increased substantially, but a soft(ish) Brexit
(or even ‘no-Brexit’) was still possible. The outcome of the ‘Brussels’ negotiations is
expected to be known and voted upon by Parliament before Christmas 2018.
In the meantime, the banks and other financial firms have been setting up offices in
various EU cities and moving staff to them, given that ‘passporting’ will be ended,
unless there is no-Brexit after all. In the no-deal case, we can expect more staff and
functions to be moved because ‘enhanced equivalence’ will be off the table.
The banks have anyway been required by their supervisors at the European Central
bank and the bank of England to prepare for the no deal eventuality in March 2019. It
was reported in the Financial Times (p.17, Weekend 27/28 October 2018) that the
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) had attributed a £100 m impairment under the new
(IFRS9) accounting standard as a forward provision against losses resulting from Brexit
and other (world trade related) uncertainties. RBS would also maintain higher capital
and liquidity ratios than required by the regulators) as a buffer against Brexit.
2 Who’s ‘City’ is it anyway?
Before the Brexit vote in June 2016, there were already concerns within the ‘Eurozone’
about the location of euro denominated clearing business (central counterparty clearin
houses, or CCPs) in London.
The Bank of England successfully challenged (ironically in the ECJ) an ECB
initiative to relocate euro clearing inside the ‘Eurozone’.
The desire to relocate euro clearing inside the Eurozone reflects growing acknowl-
edgement that the liquidity of ‘clearing houses’ (Central Counterparty Clearing houses,
or CCPs) requires central bank underpinning. The Frankfurt-based ECB, as issuer of
euro, would need to provide it as the Bank of England is not an issuer of euro within the
EU and certainly would not be post Brexit.
Further, ‘The City’ is a truly international (European and ‘Global’) financial centre.
As a European financial centre, it should expect EU financial regulators to have some
jurisdiction and, as a global financial centre, the regulatory authorities of banks and
other financial institutions in countries with well-developed financial sectors expect to
be consulted about regulatory changes initiated in London.
Since the 2007–2009 financial crisis, asset management in London has grown
substantially and so the key EU regulators are European Securities Management
Authority (ESMA) and the European Banking Authority (EBA, which is to move from
London to Paris) and the key external supervisor of banking is the ECB.
The UK financial regulatory authorities (the Prudential Regulation Authority
(PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)) anyway conform to the
BASELIII/IV proposals of the Basle Committee of Banking Supervisors (BCSB)
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and proposals of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which was until recently
chaired by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England. The FSB has coordi-
nated banking and wider financial sector regulation initiatives since the 2007–9
financial crisis.
3 Regulatory conformity post Brexit
New EU regulations relating to banking and asset management include: the second
Marketing of Financial Instruments (MFID II); the second Payments Services Directive
(PSD2); and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). These regulations are in
the process of progressive implementation.
The UK has tended to ‘gold plate’ financial regulation (as has Switzerland, another
potential post-Brexit model, especially for the financial sector) and the UK’s Retail
Distribution Review, implemented form 2012, shares a number of the subsequent
MFID II requirements.
The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has required UK banks to
implement ‘Open Banking’ from January 2018, when the GDPR was also implemented
in the UK. Open Banking, and related remedies addressing competition issues in retail
banking, cover the PSD2 requirements, but with significant enhancements.
On February 5th, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England (Sam Woods) stated
that there would be no “bonfire of banking regulations” in order to improve the
‘competitiveness’ of The City (relative to the EU) after Brexit - regulatory standards
would be maintained “at least as high as today”. In other words, there would be no
return to ‘regulation with a light touch’, which had preceded the financial crisis.
4 Brexit and the UK economy
The substantial post Brexit depreciation of the pound sterling benefited exports,
particularly of goods, and enhanced dollar denominated capital earnings from overseas.
The ‘pound’ subsequently fluctuated against the dollar, but remains well below pre-
Brexit levels. There has been no substantial ‘rebalancing’ of the economy to reduce its
reliance on financial services, but tourism has benefitted considerably.
In the run up to the financial crisis, the contribution of the financial sector to UK
GDP growth was significantly overestimated, perhaps by as much as 50%, according to
Office of National Statistics(ONS) and Bank of England estimates. In banking, some of
the overestimation was the result of the practice of pre-booking of anticipated profits to
be earnt in the future, which, in the event of the crisis, they were not. Nevertheless,
government enjoyed substantial tax revenue from the sector prior to the crisis, which
may have encouraged regulatory forbearance. The post crisis shortfall ameliorated first
by a post crisis special ‘Bank Levy’ and subsequently by an 8% corporation tax
supercharge, or bank profit ‘supertax’ in an attempt to make banks make a ‘true and
fair contribution’ during the post crisis period of ‘fiscal austerity’.
Initial Treasury scenarios of the impact of the Brexit vote on the economy proved
too pessimistic as consumer expenditure (and debt) increased, whilst real wages and
productivity growth remained stagnant. Monetary policy ‘normalisation’, which the
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Bank of England has begun tentatively pursuing by raising interest rates, can be
expected to curb the growth in consumption.
In February 2018, ‘leaked’ Treasury projections (from its upgraded post Brexit
referendum model of the economy) continued to show substantial loss of growth under
various Brexit scenarios; increasing with the degree of hardness of Brexit (and includ-
ing negative effects of reduced immigration). These projections were dismissed by hard
Brexiters, as ‘Project Fear II’; a re-run of the Treasury’s seemingly over-pessimistic pre
Brexit projections from its old model.
5 Brexit and the financial sector
To the extent that Brexit reduces growth in the UK (and the EU) it will impact
negatively on the banking, and the wider financial sectors’, business with the ‘real’
economy (the firm, or business, and household sectors).
The negative impact of Brexit on the business sector is compounded by the
uncertainty surrounding the Brexit negotiations. With a clear outcome still not in sight
over two years after the referendum, investment proposals have been abandoned or
postponed.
The proposed ‘Transition Period’ after March 2019 (itself two years after Article 50
was triggered) is a ‘double edged sword’; reducing short term uncertainty, but increas-
ing long term uncertainty; as long as there is no clear final outcome. Current uncertainty
over the length of the (possibly extended) transition periods compounds uncertainty
further.
Unless a good ‘second best’ solution can be negotiated (and accepted by Parlia-
ment), with substantial concessions agreed to assure financial stability in the EU, and
beyond, along with continued EU access to cheap and efficient financial, particularly
capital market, services provided by The City; the loss of ‘passporting’ from the UK
will have substantial further negative effects. It will also complicate, hinder, and
possibly derail the EU’s flagship Capital Markets Union (CMU) project.
6 After the single market
If the ‘third best’ solution of regulatory and supervisory ‘equivalence’, without signif-
icant enhancements, prevails, then significant relocation from London to other EU
financial centres, to preserve passporting within the EU, is likely. Given the continuing
uncertainty, some job relocation has already been announced by banks and is now
underway. With more substantial the enhancements (now much less likely), less
relocation is likely to occur (estimates range from 3500 to 12,000 short-term job
losses).
Because equivalence rules do not currently exist for all parts of the financial sector,
some mutual agreements will be required. Third country financial centres such as New
York and Singapore must self-certify the equivalence of their rules to those of the EU,
but the EU has the right of veto and this may inhibit regulatory reform in the UK.
Early indications are that Frankfurt is most attractive to banks, but Dublin, is most
attractive to insurers; whilst Paris has made a strong, and seemingly successful, pitch
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for asset management; whilst unit trusts (UCITS-Undertakings for Collective
Investments in Transferable Securities) might be attracted to Luxembourg and,
to a lesser extent, Dublin. Amsterdam and Madrid are also pitching and any
fragmentation of capital markets after Brexit may favour country and regional
capital cities.
The City thrived at the expense of Wall Street following the introduction in the US
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2004), which tightened corporate governance, in its pre-
crisis ‘light touch’ regulation period. However, under President Trump, a relaxation of
US financial regulations is underway. Hence, The City may also lose out to Wall Street;
which now holds most of the investment banking cards, with UBS, Deutsche, and
Barclays scaling back their investment banking operations.
7 Damage to the UK financial sector
In terms of value added as percentage of GDP, the UK financial sector contributed 6%,
compared to around 3.5% in Germany and France, but this may be a substantial
overestimate. The UK’s share of financial activities across the EU ranged from 82%
(interest rate OTC derivatives), 78% (forex trading), 49% (hedge fund assets), 50%
(funds management). Being more capital market oriented, and thus potentially a key
component of the EU’s Capital Market Union project, London’s share of EU bank
lending is around 26%. The share of financial services to UK GDP is allegedly 23%,
but may be half that. London’s importance in OTC derivatives globally is 39%, second
only to New York (41%) and well ahead of Paris (5%) - figures from Patrick Artus,
NATIXIS (as presented at the aforementioned conference in Paris-Nanterre in Ju-
ly 2017). Brexit and the City', Newsletter, Issue No 179, October 2017, p 15-16, Royal
Economic Society (http://www.res.org.uk/view/resNewsletter.html).
So what are the likely effects of Brexit on The City? The UK (London and
Edinburgh) hosts 2250 firms using MFID passports covering investment banking,
trading and fund management and 212 firms under AIFMD (Alternative Investment
Fund Managers Directive) passports for hedge fund and private equity fund manage-
ment, as well as the three major credit rating agencies. London conducts 80% of the
clearing of euro denominated derivatives ‘passported’ under the EMIR (European
Market Infrastructure Regulations). Further, the EU’s ‘single passport’ regime involves
numerous additional regulations (e.g. for UCITS).
‘Third country rules’ (TCR) are likely to apply to the UK, if the EU were to
recognise the UK’s post Brexit regulatory regime as ‘equivalent’ to the EU’s. But,
existing TCR agreements (e.g. with Switzerland) do not grant full access to the ‘single
market’ in financial services.
The share of UK financial sector business linked to the EU is approximately 25%,
whilst international business not linked to the EU is approximately 30% and domestic
business, 45%. The overall impact of Brexit would thus be proportional to the EU 25%
plus damage to the UK economy affecting the domestic 45%.
What might be the consequences of Brexit for The City’s asset management sector?
ESMA issued an ‘opinion’ in May 2017 on ‘delegation’ stating that there would be no
automatic recognition of existing authorisations granted by the NCAs (National Com-
petent Authorities) of the EU27. Special attention would be paid to the establishment of
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‘letterbox entities’ in the EU27 and outsourcing and delegations to third countries (such as
the UK) would only be allowed under strict conditions. NCAs should ensure that ‘sub-
stance requirements’ are met, assuring that key activities and functions are inside the EU.
This has again raised the question of whether euro clearing can remain in London!
US regulators, and lobbyists from the US, UK, and Asia, and some from the EU27 (e.g.
Luxembourg), have pushed back against restrictions on delegation, but France has been
pursuing a compromise allowing delegated outsourcing, but no letterboxes within the
EU. This seems to have prevailed, so the current delegation arrangements benefitting
the The City seem like to remain, at least initially. However, US regulatory authorities
are keeping a watchful eye on changes to the treatment of US based financial
institutions operating in London and have already signalled unease about EU regulatory
oversight of euro clearing extending to The City.
8 The final outcome for The City?
The politicians will ultimately decide (unless there is a second well-defined referen-
dum) and there are numerous potential trade-offs between the EU and the UK (and the
DUP) ‘red lines’, as outlined above. With some blurring of the ‘red lines’, there is
possibility of ‘horse trading’ across them; involving the financial and non-financial
sectors and the degree of freedom of movement people between the EU27 and the UK
and other matters. At present (November 2018), however, the Irish border issues
discussed above are proving hard to resolve given the desire to negotiate a common
solution for the whole of the UK (Great Britain (including Scotland) and Northern
Ireland) and the EU (including the Republic of Ireland).
President Trump’s call for a doubling of contributions by EU countries to NATO
makes the UK a significantly more important strategic security partner with the EU27.
This may strengthen the UK’s bargaining position.
The EU27 currently benefits from access to The City’s capital markets and there is
some risk to financial stability of an abrupt change, so this too strengthens the UK’s
hand. A bigger risk for the EU is the derailment of its CMU project.
Under the no-deal scenario, President Trump’s negative attitude towards the WTO
trade dispute resolution makes reliance onWTO trade rules precarious and his bi-lateral
trade policy makes the prospect of a good trade deal with the US uncertain. Anyway,
the EU is itself pursuing bilateral trade deals with a number of the countries with which
the UK hopes to conclude deals. It already has a deal with Canada, and is currently
negotiating with Japan, for example.
9 The denouement for the UK and the EU27
The City is a well-established global financial centre, and is currently the most
important financial centre in the EU. It has well known advantages (time zone, legal
system, language, and London as an attractive city). It may well, in the longer run, re-
align its international business, following some loss of business to other European
centres, and continue to thrive; but there is also likely to be a continued ‘tilt to Asia’ and
a re-assertion of Wall Street as the global financial centre!
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As regards the EU27, the biggest risk, apart from increased costs of some financial
products and services currently produced efficiently inside the Single Market for
financial services in The City of London, and increase risk of financial instability
during the immediate post Brexit transition period, is damage to its flagship CMU
project.
The project launched under Lord (Jonathon) Hill, as European Commissioner for
Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union in November 2014.
Lord Hill resigned from the position after the Brexit referendum. The CMU project was
conceived after the 2007–9 financial crisis and the subsequent 2010–2012 Eurozone
crisis in recognition of the heavy dependence of the EU (particularly the EU27) on its
fragmented banking sector; which was proved by these crises to be fragile.
This contrasted markedly with the US (and to a lesser extend the UK) in which debt
(bond) and equity capital markets are much further developed and provide a much
greater share of finance to the business sector. The prompt recovery of the US financial
sector and the country’s ability to deal with the post-crisis bank bad debt problems
quickly and effectively contrasted with the EU where the capital markets were under-
developed outside The City and significant bank bad debt problems remain, even as
Brexit is being negotiated.
Ongoing negotiations between the EU and Italy over its budget have illustrated that
the ‘doom loop’, which was a feature of the Eurozone crisis, has not been resolved. The
Italian government relies on selling bonds to Italian banks and other financial institu-
tions, whose value depends of the credit standing of the government. A number of
Italian banks have high bad debt ratios and rely on holding government bonds as safe
coupon bearing assets. As government risk ratings and bond yields rise, the value of the
bond portfolios fall, making it more likely that the government may have to save help
the banks. The rise in such contingent government liabilities further raises the risk
premium on government bonds, and so on.
In response to the Eurozone crisis, the EU devised a Banking Union project for the
Eurozone member countries. The project involves establishing a common bank super-
visory system, a common bank resolution regime with supporting institutions and a
common deposit guarantee scheme as well as a European Stablility Mechanism (ESM).
This is all in place except the establishment of a single risk-related deposit insurance
scheme, which will involve taxpayers in one country (say Germany) potentially
guaranteeing depositors in banks in another country (say Italy) and thus quasi fiscal
transfers between countries. French proposals for developing the ESM to form a
European Monetary Fund (EMF), to underpin stability and sustain growth also involve
greater fiscal pooling and potential transfers between member states. With the Banking
Union incomplete, the risks of damage to banks from Brexit are perhaps higher than
they would otherwise be.
The CMU aims to achieve a ‘better’ allocation of capital in the EU and to reduce
reliance on banking. This would take advantage the free movement of capital pillar of
the EU and potentially reduce the fragmentation of small and medium-sized enterprise
(SME) financing by banks serving their local markets at differential locally prevailing
(risk-related) rates. The better allocation will in part reflect enhanced corporate gover-
nance mechanisms and good stewardship practices rewarding good policies with regard
to the environmental impact, social goals and good governance practices and the UN
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as profitability and productivity and
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growth enhancement. To be successful, consistency would need to be achieved in the
application of bankruptcy laws with some sort of bankruptcy protection along the lines
of the US ‘Chapter 11’ procedures. Further ‘benchmark’ (ideally zero risk) bonds and
bills for the capital markets would need to be established. There are numerous
proposals concerning how such ‘Eurozone bonds’ might be created through joint
issuance by participating states. So far, opposition has tended to come from states with
stronger credit ratings, such as Germany.
The capital markets would operate more efficiently if taxes, especially on the profits
of corporations and interest, capital gains and dividends, and securities trading etc. were
harmonised. In addition, the bias within tax systems towards debt (through interest
‘expensing’ or ‘deductibility’) relative to equity financing, should be addressed. The
OECD is overseeing an international imitative with regard to this and it is under
consideration in the US.
A no-deal Brexit would prevent The City from performing it natural central role in
the CMU project. If a deal is negotiated between the UK and Brussels and accepted by
Parliament, then the softer the Brexit, the greater the role The City can play. But a likely
post Brexit scenario is a tendency for more capital market fragmentation than at present
with various financial centres specialising in different financial spheres developing and
major cities (perhaps Bilbao, for example) hosting regional capital markets. Capital
markets would become more dispersed, but there would be much more widespread
participation than in the prevailing City of London dominated system. This may
possibly accelerate the switch away from banking dominated systems in the EU27
and better serve the regions. Further, in this digital age, the EU27 cities serving as
capital market hubs could be fully networked to form a genuine Capital Markets Union.
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